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INTRODUCTION
North Carolina consumers gained the ability to sue for "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices" in 1969, when the state adopted a model
version of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law
promoted by the Federal Trade Commission.' Eight years later, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the original version of the
statute covered only "bargain, sale, barter, exchange[,] or traffic" in
goods and thus did not reach abusive debt collection practices.2 The
North Carolina General Assembly promptly amended the statute to
* @ 2014 Rebecca A. Fiss.
1. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 543, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1981); Matthew W.
Sawchak & Kip D. Nelson, Defining Unfairness in "Unfair Trade Practices," 90 N.C. L.
REV. 2033, 2037-38 (2012) (noting that the original version of the statute prohibited only
unfair or deceptive "trade" practices, but the General Assembly soon revised the statute
to ensure that it covered a broad range of business practices); see infra notes 2-3 and
accompanying text. Forty-eight other states adopted similar statutes around the same
time. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 543, 276 S.E.2d at 400.
2. State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 316-17, 233 S.E.2d 895,
899 (1977), superseded by statute, Act of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, §§ 1-3, 1969 N.C. Sess.
Laws 930, 930-31 (1969) (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (2013)).
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broadly include "all business practices, however denominated."' Since
then, unfair or deceptive acts or practices ("UDAP") claims have
become a frequently used litigation tool, amounting to a "boilerplate
claim" in almost every commercial or consumer transaction-based
complaint in the state.4
Around 2007, the national swell in foreclosure rates and the
resulting crash of the subprime mortgage market brought public
attention to the specific consumer problem of predatory mortgage
lending.' State legislators around the country realized that the
business structures of subprime lenders incentivized lenders to offer
their products to high numbers of low-credit borrowers and to ignore
existing consumer protection laws.6 Even before the mortgage crisis,
however, North Carolina was already on the forefront of borrower
protection: North Carolina passed the nation's first state predatory
lending law in 1999 and has since repeatedly expressed strong
legislative intent to protect consumers in the mortgage context.
Despite North Carolina's growing repertoire of mortgage-
specific statutes,' some borrowers still rely on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-
1.1,1 the state's general UDAP statute, to contest unethical lending
practices that slip through the cracks.o To decide what types of
conduct fall within the broad prohibition of section 75-1.1,u courts
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (2013).
4. Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 347 (4th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Allied Distribs., Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 847 F. Supp. 376, 379 (E.D.N.C.
1993)).
5. Susan E. Hauser, Predatory Lending, Passive Judicial Activism, and the Duty to
Decide, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1503-04 (2008).
6. See id. at 1505-06.
7. Id. at 1502, 1506; see Act of July 22, 1999, ch. 332, secs. 1-8, 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws
1202, 1202-18 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 24-1.1A, 24-1.1E, 24-2.5, 24-8, 24-10.2
(2013)).
8. See Hauser, supra note 5, at 1506-07; see, e.g., Mortgage Lending Act, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 53-243.01 to .18 (repealed 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-14(f) (2013) (limiting the
origination fee that can be charged for most secondary real property loans).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (2013).
10. Cf David Ranii, NC Supreme Court Raises Bar for Consumer Lawsuits, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/09/20/3213201/nc-
supreme-court-raises-bar-for.html (quoting consumer advocate Carlene McNulty that the
state supreme court's decision in Bumpers v. Community Bank of Northern Virginia
"'means that victims of unfair practices ... won't have a remedy' in many cases").
11. See Johnson v. Phx. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 262, 266 S.E.2d 610, 621
(1980) ("The broad language of the statute indicates that the scope of its concept and
application is not limited to precise acts and practices which can be readily catalogued."
(citing Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 306 (1963)).
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often look to the statute's purpose. As the General Assembly
articulated in the original version of section 75-1.1,
[t]he purpose of this section is to declare, and to provide civil
legal means to maintain, ethical standards of dealings ...
between persons engaged in business and the consuming public
within this State to the end that good faith and fair dealings
between buyers and sellers at all level[s] of commerce be had in
this State."
The courts have expounded on that purpose, emphasizing that
the statute was created because common law remedies-like fraud
suits-proved insufficient to protect the interests of consumers. 14
Because the statute was created to protect consumers from a
broad range of abuses, the Supreme Court of North Carolina and
consumer advocates have emphasized the importance of allowing
consumers to bring actions under section 75-1.1.11 Without the help of
ground-level enforcement by individuals, state consumer protection
agencies are hard-pressed to keep up with the ingenuity and volume
of merchants looking for new ways to bilk consumers.16 However,
advocates have also recognized the ability of judicial interpretation to
12. See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 520 (4th Cir.
1999) ("In any event, the fundamental purpose of [section 75-1.1] is to protect the
consumer, and courts invariably look to that purpose in deciding whether the Act applies."
(citation omitted)); Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 549, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981) ("In
an area of law such as this, we would be remiss if we failed to consider also the overall
purpose for which this statute was enacted.").
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1969). This language no longer exists in the current
version of the statute. See id. § 75-1.1 (2013).
14. See Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 95, 331 S.E.2d 677, 680
(1985) (reciting the Supreme Court's past findings that "the legislature's intent in enacting
N.C.G.S. § 75-16 was to create a new, private cause of action for aggrieved consumers
since traditional common law remedies were often deficient" (citing Marshall, 302 N.C. at
543, 276 S.E.2d at 400) (citations omitted)); Marshall, 302 N.C. at 543, 276 S.E.2d at 400
("Such legislation was needed because common law remedies had proved often
ineffective.").
15. See Winston Realty, 314 N.C. at 95, 331 S.E.2d at 680 ("[T]he purposes of the
statutory provisions for treble money damages and attorney's fees were to encourage
private enforcement in the marketplace and to make the bringing of such a suit more
economically feasible." (citations omitted)); Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer Protection in the
States, NAT'L CONSUMER L. CIR. 18 (Feb. 2009), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdfludap/
report_50_states.pdf.
16. See Carter, supra note 15, at 18 ("Giving consumers the ability to enforce their
state UDAP statute is crucial for consumer justice. Limited state consumer protection
enforcement budgets are not able to police the marketplace fully."). Although the state
Attorney General also has the power to bring enforcement actions under section 75-1.1,
see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-15 (2013), consumer advocates have stressed the importance of
also keeping open avenues for consumer enforcement, see Carter, supra note 15, at 18.
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undermine the effectiveness of UDAP statutes by making it more
difficult for consumers to successfully bring suits."
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has taken a large step in
that direction in Bumpers v. Community Bank of Northern Virginia."
In Bumpers, two borrowers alleged that the bank that provided their
second mortgage loans charged them for something they never
received-specifically, a "loan discount fee" without a discounted
interest rate.19 The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment in
the plaintiffs' favor, but the supreme court reversed, holding that the
plaintiffs had alleged deception and thus had to prove they had
actually and reasonably relied on the bank's "misrepresentation" that
they had received a discount.20 The majority's approach has two
principle flaws. First, after characterizing the plaintiffs' claims as
alleging misrepresentation by the defendants, the court added an
inappropriate new element to deception-based claims: consumers
alleging deceptive trade practices under section 75-1.1 must now
prove reasonable reliance,2 1 an element traditionally associated with
fraud.22 By demanding that consumers prove reasonable reliance, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina has undermined the consumer-
oriented purpose of section 75-1.1 and cleared the way for
exploitation of consumers' knowledge gaps. Second, the court failed
to question whether the defendants' alleged actions might
alternatively violate the unfair trade practices prong of section 75-1.1.
By failing to make this inquiry, the supreme court opened the door
for defendants to escape liability for unscrupulous business practices
merely by reframing a plaintiff's claim.23
17. See Carter, supra note 15, at 13.
18. - N.C. -, 747 S.E.2d 220 (2013).
19. Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., -N.C. App. _, _, 718 S.E.2d 408, 409 (2011),
rev'd and remanded, _ N.C. _, 747 S.E.2d 220 (2013). Because both the trial court and
the court of appeals found that Community Bank had not given the plaintiffs a discount,
see Bumpers N.C. App. at -, 718 S.E.2d at 409, and because the defendant did not offer
any convincing evidence to the contrary, this Recent Development assumes that the
plaintiffs received no actual discount.
20. Bumpers, _N.C. at -, 747 S.E.2d at 222.
21. See id at _ 747 S.E.2d at 222.
22. See Johnson v. Owens, 263 N.C. 754, 758, 140 S.E.2d 311, 314 (1965) ("When the
circumstances are such that a plaintiff seeking relief from alleged fraud must have known
the truth, the doctrine of reasonable reliance will prevent him from recovering for a
misrepresentation which, if in point of fact made, did not deceive him.").
23. In this case, the plaintiffs did not explicitly allege misrepresentation: they did not
allege that they were told they would receive a discount, but merely that they were
charged for one but did not receive it. See Bumpers, _ N.C. at -, 747 S.E.2d at 233
(Beasley, J., dissenting).
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This Recent Development examines the Bumpers opinion and
suggests an alternate approach that better protects consumers from
predatory lending practices. Part I examines the court of appeals' and
supreme court's reasoning in Bumpers. Part II explores the supreme
court's newly articulated reliance requirement-particularly the
demand that consumers prove "reasonable" reliance-for
misrepresentation-based UDAP claims and its possible effects on the
availability of section 75-1.1 actions. Part II then proposes a reduced
reliance standard for consumer actions, particularly in cases where
the other contracting party has a significant advantage in knowledge
and bargaining power. Part III questions why the supreme court did
not consider the case under section 75-1.1's unfairness prong and
recommends that North Carolina join other jurisdictions in holding
that charging consumers for services not provided is an inherently
unfair business practice.
I. THE BUMPERS DECISIONS AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
SURPRISING REVERSAL
A. The Facts of the Case
The case involved two consumers, each of whom received and
responded to mail solicitations from Community Bank of Northern
Virginia ("Community Bank") in 1999.24 Travis Bumpers, the primary
plaintiff in the case,25 called the toll-free number on the solicitation,
submitted a loan application by phone, and faxed the necessary
documents. 26 He was then directed to a women's lingerie shop, where
he signed the closing documents in the presence of a shop employee
who was a notary public.27 Bumpers was approved for a $28,450 loan
with an interest rate of 16.99%.28 He paid several thousand dollars in
fees to Community Bank for the loan, including a loan origination fee
of $2,062.63, a "loan discount" fee of $1,280.25, and $280 in other
24. Bumpers, - N.C. App. at _, 718 S.E.2d at 409-10.
25. Id. at _, 718 S.E.2d at 411. The other plaintiff, Troy Elliott, ultimately
participated in national class-action litigation against Community Bank, which resulted in
a settlement agreement that prohibited class members from pursuing further litigation
against the bank. Id. at _, 718 S.E.2d at 411. See generally In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622
F.2d 275 (3d Cir. 2010) (vacating the settlement agreement). Elliott thus did not
participate in the relevant appeals to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
Bumpers, - N.C. App. at _, 718 S.E.2d at 411. Bumpers, meanwhile, opted out of the
class. Id. at _, 718 S.E.2d at 411.
26. Id. at _, 718 S.E.2d at 409.
27. Id. at_, 718 S.E.2d at 409.
28. Id. at , 718 S.E.2d at 409.
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fees.29 Title America, LLC ("Title America"), the company
Community Bank had selected to provide the closing services for the
loan, also charged Bumpers $1,205 in fees, including a settlement or
closing fee, abstract or title search fee, title examination fee,
overnight fee, document review fee, and processing fee.3 0 Bumpers
paid a total of $4,827.88 in fees to the two businesses.31
The other plaintiff, Troy Elliott, received a mail solicitation
advertising a 12.99% interest rate and called the 800 number to
inquire.32 Like Bumpers, Elliott submitted a loan application by
phone and faxed the necessary documents; he then went to the
residence of a notary public to sign.33 Elliott's loan was for $35,000
with a 12.99% interest rate.34 Community Bank charged him a loan
origination fee of $2,800, a "loan discount" fee of $1,400, and a
further $280 in other fees.3 ' Title America charged Elliott fees similar
to the ones it had charged Bumpers.36
The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in September 2001 against
Community Bank for duplicative fees and the loan discount fee,
alleging that no discount was given and charging violation of section
75-1.1 and other North Carolina statutes. Over the next few years,
the lawsuit bounced between state and federal courts, meeting at
times with a national class-action lawsuit against Community Bank
that had been filed in the Western District of Pennsylvania.3 8 In April
2008, a state trial court granted partial summary judgment for
Bumpers and Elliott.39 The trial court found that Community Bank
had charged a loan discount fee without providing a discounted
interest rate and held that such a practice violated Chapter 75.40 The
court also concluded that the various itemized fees charged by
Community Bank and Title America were duplicative and constituted
systematic overcharging in violation of section 75-1.1.41 The court
29. See id at _, 718 S.E.2d at 410.
30. See id at _, 718 S.E.2d at 410.
31. Id. at _, 718 S.E.2d at 410.
32. Id. at , 718 S.E.2d at 410.
33. Id. at _, 718 S.E.2d at 410. There was no attorney or mortgage professional
present at this closing or at Bumpers's. See id. at _, 718 S.E.2d at 409-10.
34. Id. at _, 718 S.E.2d at 410.
35. Id. at _, 718 S.E.2d at 410.
36. Id. at ,718 S.E.2d at 410.
37. Id. at , 718 S.E.2d at 410.
38. Id. at., 718 S.E.2d at 410-11.
39. Id. at _, 718 S.E.2d at 411.
40. Id. at , 718 S.E.2d at 411.
41. Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., - N.C._, 747 S.E.2d 220, 225 (2013);
Bumpers, - N.C. App. at _, 718 S.E.2d at 411.
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awarded plaintiffs treble damages pursuant to section 75-16.42
Community Bank appealed.
B. Bumpers at the Court of Appeals
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that the loan
discount fee was an unfair and deceptive trade practice." The
unanimous panel likened the facts to an earlier case, Sampson-Bladen
Oil Co. v. Walters,45 in which the court of appeals found that charges
over a two-year period for 2,600 gallons of oil that were never
delivered violated section 75-1.1.1 Just as the buyers in Sampson-
Bladen Oil had been charged for undelivered goods, the court of
appeals explained, the Bumpers plaintiffs alleged that Community
Bank had charged them for something that there was no evidence
they had received: a discounted interest rate.47 In response to the
defendants' contention that the plaintiffs failed to show actual
reliance, the court of appeals characterized the loan costs not as a
misrepresentation, but as a charge for a product not delivered.48 The
court of appeals concluded that the undisputed evidence showed the
plaintiffs did not receive reduced interest rates and that "where a
defendant charges customers fees for a product that was never
provided, defendant's conduct proximately causes injury to those
customers" within the meaning of section 75-1.1.49
Meanwhile, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling
on the fees charged by Title America.so The court of appeals pointed
out that, in concluding that the closing fees charged by Title America
"were excessive and constituted 'systematic overcharging,' " the trial
court had relied on a 1998 North Carolina Bar Association survey and
the testimony of a real estate specialist." The certified specialist
testified that the reasonable and customary cost of Title America's
42. Bumpers, - N.C. App. at -, 718 S.E.2d at 411.
43. Id. at _, 718 S.E.2d at 411. The appeal led to more litigation over whether the
trial court's order was a non-appealable interlocutory order and more motions by the
parties, but the Court of Appeals was eventually obligated to rule on the merits. See id. at
, 718 S.E.2d at 411-12.
44. See id. at _ 718 S.E.2d at 415.
45. 86 N.C. App. 173, 356 S.E.2d 805 (1987).
46. Id. at 174, 177, 356 S.E.2d at 896, 808.
47. See Bumpers, - N.C. App. at _, 718 S.E.2d at 412-13.
48. Id. at , 718 S.E.2d at 413.
49. Id. at _, 718 S.E.2d at 413.
50. See id. at _, 718 S.E.2d at 414 ("The trial court further concluded that 'Title
America, LLC was Community Bank's agent,' and thus attributed Title America's
'systemic over-charging' to defendant.").
51. Id. at _, 718 S.E.2d at 414.
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closing services, if performed by an in-state attorney, would have
been about $400, but the cost could have ranged up to $1,500 if billed
at a normal hourly rate.52 The court of appeals concluded that, based
on the specialist's testimony, there was a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Title America's fees of approximately $1,205
constituted overcharging. 53 The court remanded the issue for further
proceedings.'
C. Bumpers at the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the court of
appeals' holding regarding Community Bank's loan discount fees."
Rather than adopt the court of appeals' characterization that the
defendants had charged for a product that was not delivered, the
supreme court framed the loan discount fee issue as one of
misrepresentation. 56 The court then determined that there were issues
of material fact regarding whether Community Bank actually made a
misrepresentation.5 ' The court pointed to a statement by a former
Community Bank loan officer that the checked box on plaintiffs' loan
documents indicating no "buy-down," which plaintiffs held out as
evidence that they had not received discounted rates, referred only to
temporary rate reductions that were not applicable to the plaintiffs'
second mortgage loans." The officer argued that this section of the
loan document did not address whether the borrowers had received
discounted interest rates. 9
Even if there had been no issue of fact regarding whether
plaintiffs had received a discount, the supreme court contended,
52. Id. at _, 718 S.E.2d at 414.
53. See id. _, _, 718 S.E.2d at 410, 415.
54. Id. at _, 718 S.E.2d at 415.
55. See Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., - N.C.__ 747 S.E.2d 220,229 (2013).
56. See id. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 222 ("First we must decide whether an action for
misrepresentation under section 75-1.1 requires reliance by a borrower who accuses a
lender of collecting a fee for a discounted loan without actually charging a discounted
interest rate.").
57. Id. at_, 747 S.E.2d at 222.
58. Id. at , 747 S.E.2d at 224.
59. Id. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 224. Justice Robin Hudson responded in her dissent that
this "affidavit does not actually contradict the form. At no point does [the officer] say that
plaintiffs actually received a discounted rate; instead, he attempts to explain that the
'brought-down rate' space on the form refers to a temporary rate reduction, not a
permanent one." Id. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 229 (Hudson, J., dissenting). Justice Cheri
Beasley similarly argued that "Mr. Grace's affidavit in support of defendant establishes
that plaintiffs did not receive a temporary loan discount, but it fails to demonstrate that
plaintiffs received a long-term loan discount." Id. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 236 (Beasley, J.,
dissenting).
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plaintiffs did not prove that they had relied on Community Bank's
misrepresentation.' The court asserted that "[s]uch a requirement
has been the law of this state for quite some time."61 Section 75-1.1,
the court explained, "has long encompassed conduct tantamount to
fraud, which requires reliance, and we see no reason for departure
from that requirement when the actions alleged include the
misrepresentation of a loan transaction that caused injury. "62
The court then set out a reliance test for misrepresentation-based
section 75-1.1 claims. To prove detrimental reliance under the
statute's deception prong, the supreme court held that a plaintiff must
establish "two key elements" of his mental state: (1) actual reliance
and (2) reasonable reliance.63 To establish actual reliance, the plaintiff
must show that she "affirmatively incorporated the alleged
misrepresentation into his or her decision-making process"-in other
words, that "if it were not for the misrepresentation, the plaintiff
would likely had avoided the injury altogether."' As to the second
element, "[r]eliance is not reasonable where the plaintiff could have
discovered the truth of the matter through reasonable diligence, but
failed to investigate."65 The supreme court rejected the court of
appeals' reasoning that plaintiffs had been charged for a product they
had not received because, the supreme court said, "a claim for
overcharging is not distinct from one based on misrepresentation."'
Thus, the court of appeals should have required the plaintiffs to
demonstrate their actual and reasonable reliance.67
Although the supreme court remanded the discount fee claim for
further proceedings, it strongly suggested that no detrimental reliance
could be found in this case. Notably, the court faulted Bumpers for
completing the loan transaction without asking about the amount of
the discount he was receiving or shopping around for loans with more
60. See id at _, 747 S.E.2d at 227 (majority opinion).
61. Id. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 226 (citing Pearce v. Am. Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C.
461, 471, 343 S.E.2d 174, 180 (1986)). For a discussion of the supreme court's cited support
for its reliance requirement, see infra notes 104-27 and accompanying text.
62. Id. at_, 747 S.E.2d at 222.
63. Id. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 227 (citing Pearce v. Am. Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C.
461, 472, 343 S.E.2d 174, 180-81). The Court also cited Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 649
S.E.2d 382 (2007), for the proposition that "any reliance on the allegedly false
representations must be reasonable." Forbis, 361 N.C. at 527, 649 S.E.2d at 387 (citation
omitted).
64. Bumpers, _N.C. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 227.
65. Id. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 227 (quoting Sullivan v. Mebane Packaging Grp., Inc., 158
N.C. App. 19, 26, 581 S.E.2d 452, 458 (citations omitted)).
66. Id. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 227.
67. See id. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 227.
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favorable terms.6 The court pointed out that Bumpers had also
accepted the services of Title America, the closing service provider,
without first shopping around for a less expensive provider.' Elliott,
too, chose the Community Bank loan over other options and declined
to exercise his right to cancel the loan without cost. 0 Because each
plaintiff had other options and chose Community Bank, the court
seemed to say, neither could object to the terms in their loan
agreements.
Finally, the supreme court rejected the court of appeals'
recognition of a cause of action for excessive pricing under section 75-
1.1.71 Once again, the court relied on the fact that Bumpers and Elliott
had chosen Community Bank over other vendors. 72 "In most cases,"
the high court explained, "there is nothing unfair or deceptive about
freely entering a transaction on the open market .... As a result,
when transacting parties willingly and honestly negotiate a
transaction, generally the transaction is not said to be unfair or
deceptive."7  Although the court acknowledged that there are
exceptions to this rule-such as where a vendor sells "goods or
services which are consumed or used as a direct result of an
emergency or which are consumed or used to preserve ... life, health,
safety, or economic well-being" of a person, where price gouging is
prohibited 74-no such circumstances were present in this case.
Two justices dissented. Justice Robin Hudson argued that the
record revealed that the plaintiffs did not receive discounted interest
rates on their loans despite being charged a loan discount fee. 6 She
pointed out that, despite Community Bank's testimony about the
"buy-down" check box and its irrelevance to the plaintiffs, there was
no actual evidence that the plaintiffs had in fact been given a loan
discount.77 Justice Hudson argued, "the interest rate for which
68. See id. at , 747 S.E.2d at 223.
69. See id. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 223. For a discussion of the difficulties consumers face
in shopping for closing service providers, see infra notes 133-36.
70. Id. at -, 747 S.E.2d at 223.
71. Id. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 229. The propriety of the court's holding that Title
America's excessive closing fees did not constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice is
beyond the scope of this Recent Development. However, the court's reasoning on this
point is very revealing of its attitude toward the borrowers in this case and will be
considered along with its other assertions.
72. See id. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 229.
73. Id. at , 747 S.E.2d at 228.
74. Id. at , 747 S.E.2d at 228 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-38(a) (2013)).
75. Id. at , 747 S.E.2d at 229.
76. See id. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 229 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
77. See id. at , 747 S.E.2d at 229.
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plaintiffs qualified was the interest rate they received; no further rate
reduction is noted on the Form 1008 or elsewhere."" Justice Hudson
also objected to the court's holding that actual reliance was a
necessary element of the plaintiffs' section 75-1.1 claims." She noted
that "the plain language of the statute does not require reliance."o
The statute's well-established purpose, she argued, was " 'to create a
new, private cause of action for aggrieved consumers since traditional
common law remedies were often deficient.' "81
Justice Cheri Beasley, in turn, argued that "the majority
incorrectly characterizes plaintiffs' unfair and deceptive practice claim
as one based on misrepresentation and thus incorrectly requires proof
of actual reliance to recover under section 75-1.1."1 Regardless of
whether North Carolina's UDAP statute allows recovery for price
gouging, "charging for a good or service never received is an unfair
and deceptive practice that is distinct from excessive pricing."" The
plaintiffs claimed neither that the price of the loans was too high
(excessive pricing) nor that they were told that they would receive
discounted loans (misrepresentation), Justice Beasley argued, but
that defendant charged them a fee it should not have charged at all."
"The term 'misrepresentation' appears nowhere in the [c]ourt of
[a]ppeals' opinion," while the term "overcharge" appeared (in some
form) eight times in the appellate court's statement of facts." Further,
Justice Beasley argued, prior North Carolina case law did not support
a requirement of actual reliance for a section 75-1.1 claim. According
to Justice Beasley, the cases that seemed to support the majority's
actual reliance requirement required reliance only because the
plaintiffs in those cases were basing their UDAP claims on fraud.6
The majority's reliance analysis "opens the door to an array of fees
[that do not] reflect the fair cost of a good or service provided to the
consumer," and which the consumer cannot challenge if she had any
78. Id. at._, 747 S.E.2d at 229.
79. Id. at, 747 S.E.2d at 230.
80. Id. at, 747 S.E.2d at 230 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (2013)).
81. Cf id. at -, 747 S.E.2d at 230 (quoting Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314
N.C. 90, 95, 331 S.E.2d 677, 680 (1985)) (describing the legislative intent surrounding
"section 75-16, which establishes a civil cause of action for violations of section 75-1.1").
82. Id. at , 747 S.E.2d at 232 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at -, 747 S.E.2d at 233 (citing Sampson-Bladen Oil Co. v. Walters, 86 N.C.
App. 173, 177, 356 S.E.2d 805, 808 (1987)).
84. Id. at_, 747 S.E.2d at 233.
85. Id. at_, 747 S.E.2d at 233.
86. See id. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 234.
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other reason to choose to do business with that loan provider.
Justice Beasley concluded that "[i]f entering a transaction freely is
now a defense to an unfair and deceptive practice claim, then the
entire purpose of Chapter 75 and its corollaries elsewhere in the
General Statutes is void.""
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S ERROR IN REQUIRING CONSUMERS TO
PROVE ACITIAL AND REASONABLE RELIANCE
Perhaps the most immediately notable element of the Bumpers
majority opinion is its addition of an explicit, two-pronged reliance
requirement, which plaintiffs alleging deceptive trade practices must
meet." However, the new "reasonable reliance" requirement for
deception-based section 75-1.1 claims is highly problematic. First, it
lacks the strong support in North Carolina precedent that the
Bumpers court claims-in fact, Supreme Court of North Carolina
precedent examining the statute's purpose suggests strong
disapproval for the standard now adopted by the Bumpers majority.'
Second, the heightened standard will likely damage the statute's
ability to protect consumers, particularly in the borrowing context.
Instead, North Carolina should adopt a rebuttable presumption for
deception-based section 75-1.1 claims that the plaintiff relied on the
defendant's misrepresentation.91
A. The Problems with Requiring Actual and Reasonable Reliance
By unequivocally adding a reliance element to section 75-1.1, the
Bumpers court joined a minority of states that have explicitly
required consumers to prove that they relied on a deception in order
to recover under the state's UDAP statute.' The problem with
87. Id. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 235 ("As long as the customer had some other reason that
he might have chosen to do business with the bank, such as being an existing account
holder, he can never show that, but for the misrepresentation, he would not have
conducted business with the bank.").
88. Id. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 236.
89. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 120-27.
91. See infra Part II.B.
92. In 2009, the National Consumer Law Center listed only seven states as offering
definitively "weak" protection to consumers by requiring reliance. See Carter, supra note
15, at 7-10. The Federal Trade Commission Act also arguably requires a showing of
reliance: the FTC issued a policy statement that a deceptive practice will be found "if there
is a misrepresentation, omission, or other practice, that misleads the consumer acting
reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment." Deceptive Acts and
Practices, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) [ 13,205, at 20,917 (Oct. 14, 1983) (quoting the FTC
policy statement for deceptive acts and practices enforcements). However, despite the
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requiring reliance in North Carolina is that it contradicts section 75-
1.1's primary purpose to provide remedies for consumers where
common law causes of action had proven insufficient.9 3 If consumers
are required to prove reasonable reliance to recover under section 75-
1.1, then the statute moves closer to becoming merely a codification
of fraud.94 However, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has itself
previously confirmed that section 75-1.1 prohibits a broader range of
business activities than fraud: "Proof of fraud would necessarily
constitute a violation of the prohibition against unfair and deceptive
acts; however, the converse is not always true."95
In addition to being at odds with the original purpose of section
75-1.1, the new reasonable reliance requirement has a number of
other harmful, potential side effects. First, such a requirement
encourages businesses to try to evade liability for their deceptive
practices by arguing that the consumer acted unreasonably when she
fell for the sales pitch.9 6 For instance, a business might contend that a
consumer who did not notice or understand a contractual provision
was not paying sufficient attention, or might insert clauses stating that
the consumer did not rely on what the company's representative
said.' The latter tactic helped to protect a seller of real estate in
Tucker v. Boulevard at Piper Glen LLC,98 in which the seller told the
persuasive value of the FTC Act, an interpretation of section 5 of the FTC Act as
requiring reliance does not mandate that state UDAP statutes require it also. See Johnson
v. Phx. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 262, 266 S.E.2d 610, 620 (1980) (citing Hardy v.
Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 308, 218 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1975)) ("Because of the similarity in
language, it is appropriate for us to look to the federal decisions interpreting the FTC Act
for guidance in construing the meaning of G.S. § 75-1.1.").
93. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 543, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1981).
94. See Robert G. Byrd, Misrepresentation in North Carolina, 70 N.C. L. REv. 323, 325
(1992) ("Actionable fraud consists of (1) a false representation or concealment of a
material fact that (2) is intended to and (3) does in fact (4) reasonably induce reliance and
(5) results in injury or damage." (citing Pearce v. Am. Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C.
461, 468, 343 S.E.2d 174, 178 (1986))). This is especially true given that North Carolina
recognizes a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. See id. at 354-55 (citing
Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 322 N.C. 200, 207-16, 367 S.E.2d
609, 613-618 (1988)).
95. Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 309, 318 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1975) (citing D.D.D. Corp.
v. F.T.C., 125 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1942)).
96. Carter, supra note 15, at 20.
97. Id.
98. 150 N.C. App. 150, 564 S.E.2d 248 (2002). Although this court of appeals opinion
stated a need for plaintiffs alleging deception to prove "actual reliance," see id. at 154, 564
S.E.2d at 251, North Carolina cases before Bumpers were decidedly mixed on whether
such a showing was necessary, see infra notes 106-11. Further, earlier Supreme Court of
North Carolina precedent, which rejected contributory negligence as a defense to section
75-1.1 claims, suggests that the high court would be hostile to the conclusion arrived at in
Tucker. See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff that the townhouse it was building for the plaintiff would
have a "dramatic," "unparalleled," and "panoramic" view of the
neighboring golf course." The North Carolina Court of Appeals
stated that, where a plaintiff's section 75-1.1 claim was premised on an
alleged misrepresentation by the defendant, the plaintiff must show
his "actual reliance" on the defendant's misrepresentation in order to
establish the necessary proximate causation.'" The court of appeals
concluded that, because the "Purchase and Sale Agreement" did not
mention the promised view and provided that "[n]either party is
relying on any statement or representation made by or on behalf of
the other party that is not set forth in this Agreement," the evidence
did not support actual reliance.101 A requirement of "reasonable
reliance" arguably sets the bar even higher than actual reliance-even
without a valid contractual provision disclaiming reliance, a
defendant could escape liability merely by convincing a court that the
plaintiff "should have known better" than to rely on the defendant's
representations. Such a requirement clears the way for businesses to
exploit consumers' knowledge gaps about the particular industry.
Further, a need to show reasonable reliance for each class
member can defeat class certification, thus preventing consumers
from forming class actions against unscrupulous merchants."n Private
enforcement is instrumental to the effectiveness of UDAP statutes in
combatting the many variations and instances of consumer abuse. 0
Where injuries to individual consumers are small, class certification
may be essential to enable consumers to bring a section 75-1.1 claim
and halt the exploitation.
Even aside from the damage a reliance requirement is likely to
do to section 75-1.1's effectiveness, the supreme court's new
requirement is also troubling because it significantly overstates the
rule's foundation in North Carolina law. The Bumpers court
proceeded as if even a deceptive tinge" to a section 75-1.1 claim
triggered an automatic requirement of reasonable reliance and
99. Tucker, 150 N.C. App. at 152, 564 S.E.2d at 249-50.
100. Id. at 154, 564 S.E.2d at 251.
101. Id.
102. Carter, supra note 15, at 20.
103. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
104. Plaintiffs Bumpers and Elliott indeed alleged that they had been charged for
something they had not received, but they did not frame their case as one of deception:
they did not allege that Community Bank had lured them in with the promise of a discount
and then denied them the discounted rate. See Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., _ N.C.
App. -, -, 718 S.E.2d 408, 410 (2011), rev'd and remanded, _ N.C. _, 747 S.E.2d 220
(2013).
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claimed that such a requirement "has been the law of this state for
quite some time."'o However, before Bumpers, North Carolina cases
were decidedly mixed on whether reliance for deception-related
claims was necessary.106 Though many court of appeals cases had
explicitly required reliance," a number had flatly rejected it as a
requirement for a section 75-1.1 claim. 08 Howerton v. Arai Helmet,
Ltd." was the only Supreme Court of North Carolina case before
Bumpers that appeared to require actual reliance.110 However, as
Justice Hudson argued in her dissent, Howerton was distinguishable
from Bumpers because the Howerton plaintiff based his UDAP claim
on fraud and testified as to his reliance on the defendant's
representations when he made his purchase."1' By contrast, the
Bumpers plaintiffs alleged not that they had relied on a
105. Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., _ N.C. _, _, 747 S.E.2d 220, 226 (2013)
(citing Pearce v. Am. Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 461, 471, 343 S.E.2d 174, 180
(1986)).
106. Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer Protection in the States, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW
CTR. app. B at 112-13 (Jan. 10, 2009), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/analysis-state-
summaries.pdf.
107. See, e.g., Williams v. United Cmty. Bank, - N.C. App. _, _, 724 S.E.2d 543, 549
(2012); Sunset Beach Dev., L.L.C. v. AMEC, Inc., 196 N.C. App. 202, 211-12, 675 S.E.2d
46, 53-54 (2009) ("We hold that Ball's wetlands delineations and the Master Wetlands
Map were so facially flawed that Plaintiff could not have reasonably relied on them in
deciding to purchase the GGSH tract. In light of Plaintiff's experience in developing
coastal communities and the fact that Plaintiff had unfettered access to the GGSH tract,
we cannot determine that Plaintiff actually relied on the Master Wetlands Map that was
dated more than two years earlier and signed by an individual no longer employed by the
Corps."); Bus. Cabling, Inc. v. Yokeley, 182 N.C. App. 657, 666, 643 S.E.2d 63, 69 (2007);
Tucker v. Boulevard at Piper Glen L.L.C., 150 N.C. App. 150, 153-54, 564 S.E.2d 248, 251
(2002); Pleasant Valley Promenade v. Lechmere, Inc., 120 N.C. App. 650, 658, 464 S.E.2d
47, 55 (1995) (concluding that "Pleasant Valley offered no evidence demonstrating [that] it
detrimentally relied on any statements" without citing a source for the reliance
requirement).
108. See, e.g., Cullen v. Valley Forge Life Ins. Co., 161 N.C. App. 570, 580, 589 S.E.2d
423, 431 (2003) ("[Alctual reliance is not a factor."); Nw. Bank v. Roseman, 81 N.C. App.
228, 237, 344 S.E.2d 120, 126 (1986) ("Under the statute, it is irrelevant whether the
consumer was in fact deceived or whether the act or practice was conducted in good faith."
(citation omitted)), aff'd per curiam, 319 N.C. 394, 354 S.E.2d 238 (1987); cf Rucker v.
Huffman, 99 N.C. App. 137, 142, 392 S.E.2d 419, 422 (1990) ("Generally, a consumer need
only show that an act or practice possessed the tendency or capacity to mislead, or created
the likelihood of deception, in order to establish an unfair or deceptive act under G.S.
§ 75-1.1.").
109. 358 N.C. 440, 597 S.E.2d 674 (2004).
110. Id. at 470, 597 S.E.2d at 693 ("In the present case, the record reveals a genuine
issue of material fact as to Howerton's reliance on Arai's alleged misrepresentation.").
111. See id. at 443, 470, 597 S.E.2d at 678, 693; see also Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N.
Va., - N.C. _, _, 747 S.E.2d 220, 234 (2013) (Hudson, J., dissenting).
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misrepresentation, but that the defendant charged them a fee for
something it did not deliver.1 12
Even more troubling than the court's avowal of such an
overarching reliance requirement, however, is its claim of a
foundation in North Carolina UDAP law for a reasonable reliance
element. One case the Bumpers court cited as support for its
"reasonable reliance" rule, Forbis v. Neal, was a purely common law
fraud case that did not so much as mention section 75-1.1.113 The
Bumpers court also cited Pearce v. American Defender Life
Insurance,114 both in declaring its two-pronged actual and reasonable
reliance test and in claiming that such a rule "has been the law of this
state for quite some time.""' The Bumpers court pointed principally
to a statement in Pearce that
the second requisite to making out a claim under this statute is
similar to the detrimental reliance requirement under a fraud
claim. It must be shown that the plaintiff suffered actual injury
as a proximate result of defendant's deceptive statement or
misrepresentation."'s
Notably, the Pearce court did not say that reliance-and
especially not reasonable reliance-was required; it stated merely
that the detrimental reliance element of a fraud claim was similar to
112. Bumpers, - N.C. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 233 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
113. See Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 526, 649 S.E.2d 382, 387 (2007) ("Accordingly,
our analysis narrows to whether summary judgment was proper on plaintiffs' fraud
claims.").
114. 316 N.C. 461, 343 S.E.2d 174 (1986). In Pearce, a widow brought an action against
her husband's life insurance provider to collect accidental death benefits after he was
killed in a flight training mission as a member of the United States Air Force. Id. at 465,
343 S.E.2d at 177. The defendant insurance company had previously told Lt. Pearce that
the accidental death portion of his policy would be payable if he was killed while in the
Air Force but not as a result of a direct act of war. Id. at 464, 343 S.E.2d at 176. However,
after his death, the defendant refused to pay the plaintiff's benefits under the accidental
death portion of her husband's policy. Id. at 465, 343 S.E.2d at 177. The plaintiff sued,
alleging fraud, negligence, unfair trade practices, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary
duty, and breach of the insurance company's duty to investigate claims in a fair and
equitable manner. Id. The supreme court affirmed a directed verdict against the plaintiffs
fraud claim because the plaintiff had made no showing that the defendant had made a
statement with "intent to deceive," an essential element of fraud. Id. at 468, 343 S.E.2d at
178. The court then reversed the directed verdict as to the UDAP claim, explaining that
"considering the entire evidence ... in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we hold
that the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Lt. Pearce relied to his detriment
upon the statements in defendant's letter." Id. at 472, 343 S.E.2d at 181.
115. See Bumpers, - N.C. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 226, 227 (citing Pearce, 316 N.C. at 471,
343 S.E.2d at 180).
116. Pearce, 316 N.C. at 471, 343 S.E.2d at 180; see also Bumpers, _ N.C. at _, 474
S.E.2d at 226.
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the proximate cause element of a section 75-1.1 claim."' While the
Pearce court held that the evidence of the plaintiff's husband's
detrimental reliance was sufficient to support a section 75-1.1 claim, it
did not hold this particular finding to be necessary to show proximate
cause under section 75-1.1.1" Additionally, though Pearce pointed to
evidence that plaintiff's husband had relied on the
misrepresentations, it did not breathe the word "reasonableness."119
In fact, precedent suggests that the Pearce court would have
rejected a requirement of reasonable reliance outright. In Winston
Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc. ,120 a case decided at nearly the same time as
Pearce, the Supreme Court of North Carolina disavowed language of
an earlier court of appeals decision that " '[elven if defendants
misrepresented the location of the trash fill, this sophisticated plaintiff
could and should have verified defendants' assertions.' "121 The court
held that contributory negligence was not a defense to a section 75-1.1
claim,122 reasoning that " '[t]o rule otherwise would produce the
anomalous result of recognizing that although [section] 75-1.1 creates
a cause of action broader than traditional common law actions,
[section] 75-16 limits the availability of any remedy to cases where
some recovery at common law would probably also lie.' "123 In other
words, the cases that the Bumpers court cited as evidence that a
reasonable reliance requirement "has been the law of this state for
quite some time" 124 in fact provide very weak precedential support:
one is a pure fraud case; 125 the other never mentioned reasonable
reliance1 26 and was decided only a year after the supreme court
warned that requiring section 75-1.1 claims to meet the same
117. See Pearce, 316 N.C. at 471, 343 S.E.2d at 180 ("Unlike a claim based on fraud,
proof of actual deception is not necessary."); see also Bumpers, - N.C. at _, 747 S.E.2d at
234 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
118. See Pearce, 416 N.C. at 472, 343 S.E.2d at 181.
119. See id. at 471-72, 343 S.E.2d at 180-81. Indeed, scholars did not interpret Pearce
as commanding reasonable reliance. See, e.g., Byrd, supra note 94, at 368 ("Proof of
reasonable reliance, however, is not likely to be required to establish a cause of action for
unfair or deceptive trade practices." (emphasis added)).
120. 314 N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677 (1985).
121. Id. at 94, 331 S.E.2d at 679 (quoting Libby Hill Seafood Rests., Inc. v. Owens, 62
N.C. App. 695, 700, 303 S.E.2d 565, 569 (1983)).
122. Id. at 96, 331 S.E.2d at 680-81.
123. Id. at 96, 331 S.E.2d at 680 (quoting Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 547, 276
S.E.2d 397, 402 (1981)).
124. Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va.,_ N.C._,_, 747 S.E.2d 220, 226 (2013).
125. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
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standards as common law actions defeats the purpose of the
legislation. 127
While requiring consumers to prove reasonable reliance is in
itself highly questionable, the potential consequences of its
application to the mortgage context are simply alarming. The court
faulted Bumpers for not inquiring specifically about the loan discount
fee.'28 It would thus appear that the court would only deem the
plaintiffs to have "reasonably relied" on the "misrepresentation" if
they had asked about the fee, received an affirmative assurance that
they were receiving a discount, and then later discovered that the
discount was not included in the final calculation.129 By this logic, to
ensure her ability to recover under section 75-1.1, a consumer would
be required to question every fee-and perhaps every provision-
listed in the loan documents, wait for an assurance that each fee
represented a real service, and then decide whether it was reasonable
to rely on that assurance.
Requiring consumers to engage in such thorough investigation is
simply not realistic in the lending context. The numerous fees and
provisions which have enabled lenders to tailor their products to the
needs of each borrower have also transformed mortgage loans into
complex, nontransparent documents that evade the comprehension of
even the most educated consumers." The same features make it
difficult or even impossible to comparison shop for loan providers.'
Borrowers often sign documents without having a clear
understanding of the terms of the contract, what they will get from
the transaction, or the risks they assumed.'32
127. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
128. See Bumpers, - N.C. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 223. Technically, the court reprimanded
Bumpers for "complet[ing] [his] loan transaction without first asking about the amount of
the discount he was receiving," but there was no evidence that Bumpers heard in any
other manner that he was receiving a discounted loan. Id. Bumpers and Elliott received
mailed solicitations inviting them to apply for loans, but neither the supreme court nor the
court of appeals notes any evidence that the mailers advertised anything other than a
particular interest rate. Id. at 222-23.
129. Since the trial court found that several of the fees imposed by Title America were
"redundant and duplicative," id. at 225-and thus did not correspond with a true service-
plaintiffs arguably would have been required to do the same for each individual Title
America fee as well.
130. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 55 (2008) (noting this complexity and discussing payday loans in greater detail);
Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing But
the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 196 (2008).
131. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 130, at 55.
132. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1286 (2002).
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Even after consumers have chosen a loan provider, they face
similar problems with regard to closing services. The fees charged by
Title America, which the trial court deemed redundant and
133duplicative, were "deceptive" in the same way Community Bank's
loan discount fee was deceptive. Consumers often assume that the
market for closing services is competitive and that it is in the lender's
interest to direct the borrower to the lowest cost provider, and thus
they see little need to shop around for closing-service providers.134
Accordingly, they often rely on provider recommendations from their
loan originator."'s In reality, the prices of these third-party services
vary widely, meaning that consumers regularly miss out on the
opportunity to reduce title, closing, and other settlement costs.136
Because the average consumer does not understand the closing-
services market, requiring consumers to prove reasonable reliance on
a "misrepresentation" that a fee represents an actual service opens
the door to consumer exploitation.
Given that section 75-1.1 was created to protect consumers, it is
paradoxical to require consumers to exercise more than usual
diligence. Requiring a consumer to prove reasonable reliance
effectively collapses common law fraud and section 75-1.1 deceptive
practices into the same cause of action, which the Supreme Court of
North Carolina has warned should be avoided.13 7 Thus, whatever
support there is in North Carolina law for requiring some degree of
reliance when a plaintiff alleges deceptive practices, the Bumpers
court's reasonable reliance requirement and its application to the
facts before it are plainly against the purpose of section 75-1.1.
B. The Proposal for a Reduced Reliance Requirement
North Carolina courts do not necessarily need to do away with a
reliance element altogether for deception-based UDAP claims. The
civil-enforcement provision requires that a plaintiff be "injured by
133. Bumpers, _ N.C. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 225. Given this finding, the court of appeals
and supreme court both arguably erred by analyzing them solely under an excessive-
pricing theory.
134. Susan E. Woodward, A Study of Closing Costs for FHA Mortgages, URB. INST.
105-06 (May, 2008), www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411682 fha mortgages.pdf.
135. RESPA: Regulatory Impact Analysis and Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis,
U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV. iv (2008), http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/ramh/res/
impactanalysis.pdf ("[C]onsumers may not be the best shoppers for third-party service
providers due to their lack of expertise and to the infrequency with which they shop for
these services.").
136. Id.
137. See Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 547, 276 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1981).
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reason" of the defendant's act, and it might be difficult to prove such
causation without establishing reliance."' But if proof of reliance is
required for a consumer deception claim under section 75-1.1, it must
be a less stringent requirement.13 9 This is especially true in situations
in which the two parties have unequal bargaining power, as is the case
between a borrower and a lending institution. The Supreme Court of
North Carolina has already declared such inequality to inform its
analysis under the "unfairness" prong of section 75-1.1.1o The court
must consider this lack of bargaining power as well as the typical
consumer's ignorance of an industry's business practices when
deciding whether to allow a consumer to recover under the
"deceptive" prong of the UDAP statute.14 1
This lowered bar for reliance could best be described as a
rebuttable presumption in deception-based section 75-1.1 cases that
the plaintiff relied on the defendant's representation. Such
presumption could be rebutted if the defendant could prove actual
knowledge of the misrepresentation on the part of the consumer; that
is, courts need not allow a consumer to recover section 75-16's treble
damages1 42 if there is proof that she knew the defendant's statement
was untrue, could have declined to enter into the transaction, and
signed the contract anyway. Nonetheless, a consumer should be
permitted to assume that his lender's representations to him are
accurate'43 and that any service charge, however vaguely named,
represents an actual service. The volume of documents associated
with some transactions, including loans, makes it fundamentally
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (2013); see Byrd, supra note 94, at 367 n.328 ("It is
difficult to understand how injury and causation can be present in a private damage action
when there is no reliance on the representation on which the claim is based.").
139. See Byrd, supra note 94, at 367.
140. See Johnson v. Phx. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 264, 266 S.E.2d 610, 622
(1980) (explaining that the "essence" of unfairness analysis is that "[a] party is guilty of an
unfair act or practice when it engages in conduct which amounts to an inequitable
assertion of its power or position" (citations omitted)). For more on the unfairness prong,
see infra Part IV.
141. Johnson, 300 N.C. at 264,266 S.E.2d at 622.
142. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (2013).
143. An exception can be made if the statement is obvious puffery. Cf Harrington
Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 38 N.C. App. 393, 403, 248 S.E.2d 739, 745 (1978) ("The
statements in [defendant's] advertisements as to which [plaintiff] complains did not, in our
opinion, go so far beyond tolerable limits of puffing as to constitute unfair acts proscribed
by G.S. 75-1.1."). For example, where a lender's agent claims that the lender's loans are
the "best deal you'll find anywhere," the court is not required to let the consumer recover
under section 75-1.1 because she later found a loan with a lower interest rate. Cf id.
(finding no liability where advertisements were targeted at customers who were likely to
recognize exaggerated claims).
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impractical and unfair to require a consumer to investigate and
absorb the meaning of every single provision.1' For the same reason,
provisions such as the one in Tucker that "[n]either party is relying on
any statement or representation made by or on behalf of the other
party that is not set forth in this Agreement" 145 should not be held to
automatically protect a party from a section 75-1.1 claim.'" Insofar as
the goal of section 75-1.1 is to protect consumers and hold businesses
liable for unfair and deceptive practices, the presumption should be in
favor of the consumer and against the deceptive party.
III. THE UNFAIRNESS PRONG: THE PERFECT VEHICLE FOR
ALLEGATIONS OF BOGUS CHARGES
One of the more anomalous features of the North Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in Bumpers was its insistence that the
plaintiffs' claim be evaluated under the "deceptive" prong even
though the plaintiffs did not expressly allege misrepresentation.47
The court rejected the court of appeals' "systematic overcharging"
theory,'148 reasoning that "a claim for overcharging is not distinct from
one based on misrepresentation." 149 However, section 75-1.1 prohibits
"unfair or deceptive" conduct,' and while the court concluded that
the defendant's alleged act was not deceptive, the court never
considered whether it might qualify as "unfair." It is clear in North
Carolina UDAP law that just because a practice is deemed not
deceptive does not in any way bar the court from inquiring whether it
144. See supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
145. Tucker v. Boulevard at Piper Glen L.L.C., 150 N.C. App. 150, 154,564 S.E.2d 248,
251 (2002).
146. These provisions are admittedly in line with the parol evidence rule, which
"prohibits the admission of [evidence of prior oral agreements] to vary, add to, or
contradict a written instrument." Van Harris Realty, Inc. v. Coffey, 41 N.C. App. 112, 115,
254 S.E.2d 184, 186 (1979). However, North Carolina law allows admission of parol
evidence to prove that a written contract was procured by fraud. Godfrey v. Res-Care,
Inc., 165 N.C. App. 68, 78, 598 S.E.2d 396, 403 (2004). While such provisions may be
enforceable in most cases, they should not be accepted as an automatic defense to claims
like fraud and section 75-1.1 violations; otherwise, merchants could too easily insulate
themselves from UDAP liability by slipping these clauses into the small print.
147. See Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., _ N.C.__, 747 S.E.2d. 200, 226 (2013);
see also supra Part I.C.
148. The court of appeals relied on its previous Sampson-Bladen Oil decision, see supra
notes 42-46 and accompanying text, which held "that systematically overcharging a
customer for two years, as the jury found was done here ... is an unfair trade practice . . .."
Sampson-Bladen Oil Co. v. Walters, 86 N.C. App. 173, 177, 356 S.E.2d 805, 808 (1987)
(emphasis added).
149. Bumpers, _ N.C. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 227.
150. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (2013) (emphasis added).
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is unfair"'1 : "While an act or practice which is unfair may also be
deceptive, or vice versa, it need not be so for there to be a violation of
the Act."1 52 Thus, the Bumpers court committed a fundamental error
in not also inquiring whether the defendants' practices were unfair.
By doing so, the Supreme Court of North Carolina opened the door
for lower courts to pick and choose which parts of North Carolina
UDAP law they wish to apply.
Admittedly, judicial guidance as to what practices should be
deemed "unfair" under section 75-1.1 is undeveloped compared to
the case law on deceptiveness.53 North Carolina courts have
alternated between a number of definitions of unfairness. 154 For
example, "[a] practice is unfair when it offends established public
policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive,
unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers";
alternatively, "[a] party is guilty of an unfair act or practice when it
engages in conduct which amounts to an inequitable assertion of its
power or position."5 6 But North Carolina is not confined to its own
case law for inspiration and guidance on how to determine which
practices are "unfair." North Carolina courts have often looked to
federal decisions interpreting the Federal Trade Commission Act, as
the language of section 75-1.1 closely parallels that legislation,57 and
many other states around the country have similarly modeled their
UDAP statutes."ss
151. See Johnson v. Phx. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 263, 266 S.E.2d 610, 621
(1980) ("The concept of 'unfairness' is broader than and includes the concept of
'deception.' " (citation omitted)).
152. Id.
153. See Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 1, at 2036.
154. Id. at 2051.
155. Johnson, 300 N.C. at 263, 266 S.E.2d at 621 (citations omitted). The Supreme
Court has again relied on this definition to hold that an insurance company that does not
"'attempt[] in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in
which liability has become reasonably clear' . . . also engages in conduct that embodies the
broader standards of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 because such conduct is inherently unfair,
unscrupulous, immoral, and injurious to consumers." Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting
Ass'n, 352 N.C. 61, 71, 529 S.E.2d 676, 683 (2000) (citations omitted).
156. Johnson, 300 N.C. at 264, 266 S.E.2d at 622 (citing Spiegel, Inc. v. F.T.C., 540 F.2d
287, 293 (7th Cir. 1976)).
157. See Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 308, 318 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1975). See generally
Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 1 (arguing that North Carolina courts should look to
interpretation of section 5 of the FTC Act for guidance in analyzing "unfairness" claims).
158. See Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 543, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1981) ("Between
the 1960[s] and [the 1980s], North Carolina was one of forty-nine states to adopt consumer
protection legislation designed to parallel and supplement the F.T.C. Act." (citation
omitted)).
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As it happens, charging fees for services not rendered is
commonly considered an "unfair" trade practice outside of North
Carolina.159 For example, in Commonwealth v. DeCotis," the
Massachusetts high court held that the practice of charging
homeowners a fee at the time of a sale without rendering any services
in connection with the fee constituted an unfair act or practice. 161 This
was so even where the homeowners were willing to pay the fee and
knowingly contracted to pay it.162 Federal consumer protection laws
also warn against charging fees other than for services actually
provided."
North Carolina courts should hold that charging fees not
connected to an actual service is an unfair trade practice. The
"essence" of an unfair trade practice under North Carolina law is that
"[a] party is guilty of an unfair act or practice when it engages in
conduct which amounts to an inequitable assertion of its power or
position."" Charging a consumer for a made-up service is certainly
an inequitable assertion of power, since only one party-the one that
wrote the contract-is in a position to carry out such an abuse.
CONCLUSION
The business of mortgage lending has grown increasingly
complex, far beyond the comprehension of the average consumer. By
requiring consumers to prove the same standard of reliance
demanded in fraud claims, the Supreme Court of North Carolina goes
squarely against the purpose of section 75-1.1 and opens the door for
fraudulent businesses to deceive all but the savviest of consumers.
The Bumpers decision threatens not only the integrity of the
159. See 36 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 8 (1996).
160. 316 N.E.2d 748 (Mass. 1974).
161. See id. at 753-54.
162. Id. ("Although deception may not have been involved where the disclosure by the
defendants to the prospective [buyer] was timely and complete, we believe that the
practice of charging a fee for no service whatsoever was an unfair act or practice within the
intent of [the Massachusetts UDAP statute] and that it was therefore unlawful.").
163. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 2607(b) (2012) ("No person shall give and no person shall
accept any portion, split, or percentage of any charge made or received for the rendering
of a real estate settlement service in connection with a transaction involving a federally
related mortgage loan other than for services actually performed."). The Supreme Court
of the United States recently held that this language "covers only a settlement-service
provider's splitting of a fee with one or more other persons; it cannot be understood to
reach a single provider's retention of an unearned fee." Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 2034, 2040 (2012). However, the warning against retention of a fee for services
not actually performed remains significant.
164. Johnson v. Phx. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 264, 266 S.E.2d 610, 622 (1980)
(citing Spiegel, Inc. v. F.T.C., 540 F.2d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 1976)).
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consumer loan situation but any business transaction in which the
contracting party has the opportunity to slip language into the small
print or in which the consumer depends on that party for information
about the transaction. The more difficult the court makes it for
consumers to enforce section 75-1.1, the more freedom dishonest
merchants have to take advantage of North Carolina consumers
without consequence.
REBECCA A. FIss"
** The author would like to thank Jerry Hartzell, who represented Mr. Bumpers, for
sharing his knowledge and invaluable feedback. The author would also like to thank Chris
Olson for his feedback and the Board of the North Carolina Law Review for its extreme
patience and care.
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